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U.S. Supreme Court Surveys:      
2013–2014 Term 
Harris v. Quinn:                                  
What We Talk About When We Talk 
About Right-to-Work Laws 
Michael J. Yelnosky* 
Who could oppose a right to work?  What could anyone find 
objectionable in the recent declaration by the State of Michigan 
that it, like twenty-three others, is a right-to-work state?1 
It turns out that it depends on what the meaning of a “right to 
work” is.  If a right to work means, as it would in common usage, a 
right to get and keep a job assuming satisfactory qualifications 
and performance, opponents abound.  They include academics 
espousing the benefits of unregulated markets2 and the United 
States Chamber of Commerce, which argues that restrictions on 
an employer’s freedom to discharge employees at-will hinders job 
growth.3  And the opponents of this right to work have prevailed.  
 
* Dean and Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law.  Thanks to 
Amanda Garganese for her research assistance.   
 1.  See Elizabeth Hartfield, Michigan Governor Signs Right to Work Bill 
Into Law, ABC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ 
michigan-governor-signs-work-bill-law/story?id=17934332.  
 2.  See generally, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at 
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984). 
 3.  U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE IMPACT OF STATE EMPLOYMENT 
PRACTICES ON JOB GROWTH: A 50-STATE REVIEW 13–15 (2011), available at 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/201103WFI_Sta
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In every state, with the exception of Montana,4 employers are 
generally free “to discharge or retain employees at will for good 
cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause.”5  This rule of at-will 
employment is the bedrock principle of American employment law. 
In American labor law, by contrast, “right to work” has a very 
different meaning.  It has, and this is not hyperbole, “nothing 
whatsoever to do with granting anyone a right to get work or 
protecting those who have a job from losing it.”6  Instead, right-to-
work laws permit employees in the private sector who are covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement that is negotiated and 
administered by a union to refuse to pay for the union’s services.7  
Under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), in states 
without right-to-work laws, non-members covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement can be required under that agreement to 
pay their fair share for those services.8  The Supreme Court has 
determined that this NLRA provision permits objectors to refuse 
to pay for union “political activity,” an interpretation, the Court 
has continued to explain, that avoids a difficult First Amendment 
question.9  Labor lawyers refer to provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements that require lawful payments by non-
members as “union-security clauses.”10 
The proponents of union-security clauses explain that without 
them, 
individual workers can easily become “free riders,” taking 
the benefits of collective representation without paying 
their fair share of the costs.  Not only dissenters but any 
 
teBook.pdf.  
 4.  See Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2013) (making it unlawful for an employer to discharge 
an employee without good cause).  
 5.  Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884), overruled in 
part by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915). 
 6.  Rick Ungar, Op-ed, ‘Right-to-Work’ Laws Explained, Debunked And 
Demystified, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2012, 2:37 P.M.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
rickungar/2012/12/11/right-to-work-laws-explained-debunked-demystified/.  
 7.  See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012).  
 8.  Id. § 158(a)(3). 
 9.  Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988).  
 10.  See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Op-ed, ‘Right to Work’ is a Misnomer, 
NAT’L L.J. & LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, at 31, 31; Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, 
Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. 800, 813 (2012). 
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employee who wants to save a buck can “free ride.”  The 
net result may be that the union cannot afford to 
represent workers effectively, and everyone suffers.11 
To put a finer point on it, a union has a duty to represent all 
members of the bargaining unit fairly, without making 
distinctions between members and non-members.12  Thus, in a 
right-to-work state an employee could take any pay raise 
negotiated on her behalf by the union but refuse to pay any of the 
costs associated with the union’s negotiating operation. 
Right-to-work proponents make several arguments against 
enforcement of union-security clauses.  Some are based on notions 
of individual liberty and freedom from coercion.  As the National 
Right to Work Committee puts it, no “American[ ] . . .  should ever 
be forced to affiliate with a union in order to get or keep a job.”13  
There are economic arguments as well.  The standard economic 
case for right-to-work laws goes something like this:  unionization 
is harmful because it artificially increases the wages of union 
labor and decreases the wages of non-union workers.  Right-to-
work laws make it harder for unions to organize workers.  
Therefore, right-to-work laws are good for the economy.  Moreover, 
if firms choose to locate in areas where the risk of unionization is 
lower, right-to-work laws are particularly good for those local 
economies.14 
The situation in the public sector is more complicated.  The 
private sector is governed by one body of law—the NLRA15—but 
each state has its own public sector labor law.  And those laws are 
 
 11.  Cynthia Estlund & William E. Forbath, Op-ed, The War on Workers, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/opinion/the-
supreme-court-ruling-on-harris-v-quinn-is-a-blow-for-unions.html; accord 
Estreicher, supra note 10, at 31 (“[A] right to free ride on union 
representation . . . deprive[s] unions of a justifiable funding mechanism so 
that they no longer can play a useful collective-bargaining role in our 
society.”).  
 12.  See Craig Becker, The Pattern of Union Decline, Economic and 
Political Consequences, and the Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 1637, 1645 (2014). 
 13.  About NRTWC, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK COMM., http://nrtwc.org/about-
2/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).  
 14.  See Raymond Hogler & Steven Shulman, The Law, Economics, and 
Politics of Right to Work: Colorado’s Labor Peace Act and its Implications for 
Public Policy, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 933–34 (1999). 
 15.  29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
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quite variable.16  Some states prohibit public employees from 
engaging in collective bargaining altogether; some states have 
public sector labor laws that look much like the NLRA; and other 
states give public sector unions more power than their private 
sector counterparts.17  Some states, most importantly for our 
purposes, permit public sector unions to negotiate union-security 
clauses.18  That brings us, almost, to Harris v. Quinn.19 
Many have argued that the balance struck by the Court and 
Congress with respect to enforcement of union-security clauses in 
the private sector should not be transferred to the public sector.  
In the public sector, they argue, the First Amendment rights of 
objectors are more acute.  To force a public school teacher, for 
example, to pay for the services of a union that teacher opposes 
forces that teacher to support the union’s political positions.  
Bargaining with a public body—e.g., a school board—the 
argument goes, necessarily requires a union to take positions on 
public policy, even if that union is simply negotiating for a wage 
increase.20  In short, negotiations with a public body about 
resources are inescapably political. 
This issue came before the Court in 1977 in Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education.21  Under Michigan law at that time, local 
government employees had rights to organize and engage in 
collective bargaining, and union-security provisions were 
enforceable, under which every employee represented by a union, 
even though not a union member, was required to pay a service 
fee equal in amount to union dues.22  A union selected by a 
majority of the public school teachers in Detroit negotiated, as 
part of a comprehensive collective bargaining agreement with the 
 
 16.  See, e.g., Vijay Kapoor, Public Sector Labor Relations: Why It Should 
Matter to the Public and to Academia, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 401, 409 
(2003). 
 17.  See, e.g., Milla Sanes & John Schmitt, Regulation of Public Sector 
Collective Bargaining in the States, CENTER FOR ECON. & POL’Y RESEARCH, 
Mar. 2014, at 1, 4–5, available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/state-
public-cb-2014-03.pdf.  
 18.  See Martha H. Good, Comment, The Expansion of Exclusive 
Privileges For Public Sector Unions: A Threat to First Amendment Rights?, 53 
U. CIN. L. REV. 781, 785 (1984).  
 19.  134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).  
 20.  See generally id.  
 21.  431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 22.  Id. at 211.  
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Detroit Board of Education, a union-security provision.23  A group 
of teachers thereafter filed suit, alleging that their First 
Amendment rights would be violated by enforcement of the 
provision—both because they opposed collective bargaining in the 
public sector, and because the provision would require them to pay 
for union political expenditures unrelated to collective 
bargaining.24 
The Court first reviewed existing precedents, which, as 
summarized above, permit enforcement of union-security 
provisions in the private sector so long as the provisions do not 
require objectors to pay for union political activity.25  The Court 
described those cases as holding that the objector’s First 
Amendment interests in withholding any and all financial support 
from the union were outweighed by “the legislative assessment of 
the important contribution of the union shop to the system of 
labor relations established by Congress.”26  Adhering to those 
cases, the Court acknowledged, would require validation of the 
Michigan scheme so long as the service charges obtained from 
objectors were used exclusively “to finance expenditures by the 
Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract 
administration, and grievance adjustment.”27 
However, the Court then took the time to consider whether 
application of those precedents was appropriate, given the “very 
real differences” between private and public sector collective 
bargaining.28  The Court reasoned that the State’s interests in the 
public benefits of union-security provisions were identical in the 
private and public sectors.29  It also found that private and public 
sector objectors had equally important First Amendment rights at 
stake when being forced to financially support organizations to 
which they objected.30  Thus, the Court held that the 
constitutional balance should be the same in the private and 
 
 23.  Id. at 211–12. 
 24.  Id. at 212–14. 
 25.  Id. at 217–20 (citing Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); 
Railway Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956)). 
 26.  Id. at 222.  
 27.  Id. at 225–26.   
 28.  Id. at 230.   
 29.  Id. at 232. 
 30.  Id. at 230–31. 
YELNOSKYFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015  3:26 PM 
124 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 20:119 
public sectors.31  The Court held that Michigan’s authorization of 
union-security provisions in the public sector did not violate the 
First Amendment rights of objectors, except that objectors could 
not constitutionally be required to pay for union spending 
unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative, 
such as spending to support political candidates or express 
political views.32 
This is where the law stood when Harris v. Quinn came along.  
When the Court granted certiorari33 the case had a relatively low 
profile.  Harris appeared to present an issue involving a rather 
arcane aspect of public sector labor law and Medicaid in-home 
personal care providers.  On the other hand, as some observers 
began to point out, Harris could serve as a vehicle for the Court to 
consider whether to overrule Abood.34  At oral argument it became 
quite clear that the petitioners were asking the Court to overrule 
Abood and prohibit union-security provisions in the public sector 
on First Amendment grounds35—an argument that the Court took 
quite seriously.  Therefore, by the time the Court issued its 
decision, interest in the case had increased dramatically. 
The plaintiffs in Harris provided in-home personal care 
services in Illinois to individuals who qualified under the federal 
Medicaid program.36  Under the program, Illinois, subsidized by 
federal Medicaid funds, paid these “personal assistants,” but the 
assistants were hired and under the control of the individual 
Medicaid-eligible patients.37 
Under Illinois law, state employees were authorized to form 
unions and engage in collective bargaining.38 In addition, union- 
security provisions in any resulting agreement were enforceable.39  
 
 31.  Id. at 232. 
 32.  Id. at 230–37. 
 33.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 
(2014) (No. 11-681), 2011 WL 6019918. 
  34.  See, e.g., Will Baude, Harris v. Quinn and the Future of Abood, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 1, 2013, 9:51 P.M.), http://www.volokh.com/2013/ 
10/01/harris-v-quinn-future-abood/ (referring to Harris as a “sleeper”). 
 35.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, Harris, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 11-
681), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/11-681_8mj8.pdf. 
 36.  134 S. Ct. at 2626.   
 37.  Id. at 2624.   
 38.  Id. at 2625; see also 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/6(a), (c) (2008). 
 39.  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2625; see also 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 315/6(e).   
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When the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) sought 
to organize the personal assistants, the Illinois Labor Relations 
Board concluded that the assistants were not employed by the 
State and, therefore, were not eligible to organize and engage in 
collective bargaining with the State.40 
However, the Illinois legislature amended the law to provide 
that the personal assistants were public employees solely for the 
purposes of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor Relations 
Act.41  Thereafter, a majority of the personal assistants voted for 
representation by the SEIU, and the union entered into an 
agreement with the State of Illinois that contained a union-
security provision.42  The plaintiffs did not support the union and 
claimed that enforcement of the provision would violate their First 
Amendment rights.43  Ultimately, the Court concluded, by a 
classic 5–4 vote (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, 
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas in the majority) that the plaintiffs’ 
claim had merit, but not because union-security provisions were 
unenforceable in the public sector.44 
The constitutional infirmity the majority found in the Illinois 
scheme was that it required personal assistant objectors to pay for 
union representation vis-à-vis the State when, in fact, the 
personal assistants were employed by their Medicaid-eligible 
patients.45  This meant that the power of the union to negotiate 
with the State was circumscribed—essentially the union was 
limited to negotiating with the State over payment rates.46  The 
Court refused to “extend” Abood to a situation where the union 
could not offer the personal assistants it represented the benefits 
of increased bargaining power with regard to all terms and 
conditions of employment.47  Abood’s rationale, the Court 
explained, “is based on the assumption that the union possesses 
the full scope of powers and duties generally available under 
American labor law.”48  The personal assistants, by contrast, were 
 
 40.  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2625–26. 
 41.  Id. at 2626; see also 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2405/3(f) (2001). 
 42.  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626.   
 43.  Id.   
 44.  Id. at 2634-37. 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. at 2634–36. 
 47.  Id. at 2637 n.18, 2638.  
 48.  Id. at 2626.  
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explicitly deemed by Illinois law to be “public employees solely for 
the purpose of unionization and the collection of an agency fee.”49 
The Court’s narrow rationale for ruling for the personal 
assistant objectors; the rather unique labor law regime created in 
Illinois for the personal assistants; and the distinctive work 
relationship between the personal assistants, the Medicaid-
eligible clients, and the State of Illinois do not, however, make 
Harris v. Quinn a non-event.  Harris seems to foreshadow the 
demise of Abood. 
Before explaining its narrow holding, the majority spent 
approximately seven pages explaining why Abood should be 
overruled.50  First, explained the Court, Abood was “something of 
an anomaly” because free-rider arguments are generally 
insufficient to justify interfering with legitimate First Amendment 
interests.51  Second, the Court characterized the private-sector 
cases upon which the Abood Court relied in rejecting the broad 
constitutional challenge to union-security provisions in the public 
sector as “thin,” “narrow,” and “remarkable.”52  It therefore 
criticized the Abood Court for relying so heavily on those cases 
and ignoring important differences between private and public 
sector collective bargaining.53  In the latter instance, explained 
the Court, the objectors’ First Amendment interests are 
heightened because issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits 
are important political issues.54  Moreover, as a consequence, the 
line between chargeable and non-chargeable union activities in 
the public sector is extraordinarily difficult to demarcate, and it is 
the objector’s burden to limn the two categories.55  Finally, the 
Court explained that there was no necessary relationship between 
a union’s ability to effectively negotiate on behalf of all members 
of a bargaining unit and the requirement that all those members 
financially support the union’s activities.56 
When the majority was done with Abood, the 1977 case was 
 
 49.  Id. at 2627.  
 50.  See id. at 2627–34.  
 51.  Id. at 2627 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 
S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 52.  Id. at 2627–30. 
 53.  Id. at 2631–33. 
 54.  Id. at 2631–32. 
 55.  Id. at 2633. 
 56.  Id. at 2640–41. 
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bruised and bloodied—all but dead.  As Justice Kagan wrote in 
her dissent, “[t]oday’s majority cannot resist taking potshots at 
Abood.”57  She commended, but refused to applaud, the majority 
for stopping short of overruling Abood.58 
I am much less sanguine.  The majority opinion in Harris 
reads like Abood’s obituary, and it seems only a matter of time 
before a majority, maybe even this majority, will finish the job.  
These are not good times for unions.  Private sector union density 
is now below seven percent.59  And unions in the public sector 
have become the target of considerable criticism and political 
attacks.  Some have speculated that Justice Alito, who wrote the 
majority in Harris, thought he had five votes to overrule Abood, 
which explains the extensive language essentially eviscerating the 
decision.60  Whether or not that is true, there is little left for a 
majority to do to conclude that the First Amendment provides for 
a right-to-work law in the public sector. 
 
 
 57.  Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2652–53 
(“Readers of today’s decision will know that Abood does not rank  
on  the  majority’s  top-ten  list  of  favorite precedents—and that the majority 
could not restrain itself from saying (and saying and saying) so.”). 
 58.  Id. at 2645.   
 59.  See Dave Jamieson, Union Membership Ticks Up In The Private 
Sector, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2014, 12:46 P.M.), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/24/union-membership-2013_n_4659586.html. 
 60.  See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, In attacking unions, the Roberts court 
forgets a key lesson of the New Deal, SLATE (June 30, 2014, 3:04 P.M.),  
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/
2014/scotus_roundup/supreme_court_2014_harris_v_quinn_forgets_the_lesso
n_of_the_new_deal.html. 
   
